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InTroducTIon
To adequately protect the national security interests of the United States, the President should immediately imple-ment domestic policies and vigorously pursue agreement 
on international standards that stabilize greenhouse gas concen-
tration at 350 parts per million (“ppm”) as soon as possible, and 
no later than 2050.1 The Obama Administration acknowledged 
the real threat climate change poses to U.S. security in the 2009 
National Intelligence Strategy (“NIS”) and 2010 National Secu-
rity Strategy (“NSS”).2 However, in failing to use the authority 
delegated to the Committee on Transnational Threats to imple-
ment climate change prevention policies, the Administration has 
not met its obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to 
protect U.S. people, property, and interests.3
The most politically feasible and compelling argument for 
addressing climate change promptly is that U.S. security depends 
upon it. Threats to security emanating from climate change are 
many and varied, internal and external, and are already begin-
ning to occur.4 This article explains the science behind climate 
change, then discusses the impacts that climate change will 
have on people and communities, and the relationship of those 
impacts to threats on U.S. security. In response to these impacts, 
the article examines national security law and the Administra-
tion’s faulty understanding of its power under that law and sug-
gests how the Administration can use the authority it already 
possesses to implement the necessary policies to ensure a com-
prehensive national security program and actions to take to meet 
the present and future threat posed by climate change.
clImaTe scIence
There is no longer any scientifically sound question as to 
whether anthropogenic climate change is occurring, and will 
continue to occur in the future; only the ongoing debate of how 
much change human activity will produce remains.5 The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report finds 
definitive anthropogenic warming between 3.2°F and 9.2°F 
over the twenty-first century.6 Based on the amount of carbon 
already released into the atmosphere, the Earth is committed to 
a temperature increase of at least 2°F.7 The best estimates of 
the IPCC, which depend on future reductions in CO2 emissions, 
predict global average temperature increases of 3.2°F to 7.2°F 
during the twenty-first century.8
In order to understand climate science, it is important to 
also understand the political environment surrounding climate 
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change science and to consider what that means for determining 
future policies in the United States. The IPCC is a joint project 
of the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organi-
zation that has compiled extensive, highly scrutinized data9 to 
become the source of internationally accepted science on cli-
mate change, relied on by governments around the world includ-
ing the U.S. government.10
The problem with the scientific numbers presented by the 
IPCC is that they are influenced by the politics of strong, fossil-
fuel-dependent nations like Saudi Arabia, the United States, and 
China, whose economies run on the sale and use of fossil fuels.11 
The desire to keep their economies humming without chang-
ing their habits is a strong incentive to downplay the impacts 
of CO2.
12 Middle Eastern member states, like Saudi Arabia, 
work to ensure that the primary export upon which their entire 
economy depends on is not rendered valueless by the findings.13 
Thus, the highly certain findings of the IPCC report exist in spite 
of the efforts of oil exporting countries to water-down the lan-
guage until more evidence of anthropogenic change is found.14 
The result is an IPCC report with watered-down, politically 
motivated findings,15 being represented to the global community 
as scientifically factual findings,16 and ultimately the interna-
tional acceptance of compromised science as the basis for cli-
mate change policy.
Other scientists, unconstrained by the challenges within 
the IPCC, believe more significant temperature—and climate—
change will occur.17 Scientists know from studying ice cores 
that Earth’s surface temperature increased 9°F when CO2 lev-
els in the atmosphere rose by 100 ppm at the end of the last 
ice age.18 Thus, logic renders it unlikely that a doubling of CO2 
over the level in 1800 (an increase of approximately 280 ppm, 
or nearly three times larger than the prior increase) will result in 
a temperature increase of just 5.4°F, as the IPCC seems to pre-
dict.19 Based on scientific data, leading experts believe that the 
current global goal must be to reduce CO2 concentrations below 
350 ppm in order to prevent and reverse destabilizing global 
warming.20
Climate science is becoming increasingly more accurate 
as scientists continue to refine computer simulation programs 
called Global Circulation Models.21 With increasing frequency, 
these computer programs are able to accurately model weather 
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and climate events based on inputted data, for events that already 
happened in the past.22 Because the events already happened and 
we know what the model should look like, the computer models’ 
accuracy can be readily tested and proven by its ability to cor-
rectly forecast those events.23
Comparing current predictions with known previous atmo-
spheric changes illustrates the appropriateness of skepticism 
regarding the more conservative scientific estimates, like those 
of the IPCC. Further, the scientifically accepted 550 ppm CO2 
“threshold,” which is the maximum allowable level to avoid 
inducing dangerous climate change, is nearly twice as high as 
pre-Industrial Revolution levels.24 Even the IPCC predicts an 
increase in temperature varying from 3.2°F to 7.2°F,25 which 
is clearly below the 9°F history has proven can occur.26 Given 
these illogical ratios, it is reasonable to be skeptical of the con-
servative estimates of the impacts of climate change, rather than 
skeptical that climate change is real.
ways In whIch clImaTe chanGe ImpacTs 
ThreaTen u.s. securITy
Congress and the White House understand that climate 
change threatens U.S. national security, because it threatens 
internal systems and contributes to the destabilization of gov-
ernments and people abroad.27 The range of threats begin with 
“natural” disasters, including increasingly severe hurricanes like 
Katrina in 2005,28 and extend to heightened terrorism risks as 
diminished resources threaten livelihoods and foreign popula-
tions slip further into extremism.29
Natural disaster impacts are easier to visualize because they 
have a direct cause and effect. Sea level rise threatens to wipe 
small island nations off the face of the Earth.30 Rapid rising sea 
levels of this type directly threaten military infrastructure on 
low-lying islands, and in all coastal regions worldwide.31 More 
hurricanes of higher intensity means military equipment and 
personnel must be moved out of harm’s way, adding expense 
and wear and tear, reducing general readiness, and interrupting 
training operations.32 Increasingly severe storms can devastate 
infrastructure, as hurricane Andrew damaged Homestead Air 
Force Base in Florida in 1992 and prevented the base from ever 
reopening.33 More frequent and intense flooding has similar 
impacts, requiring disaster response, while simultaneously dam-
aging the economy, and wasting resources that could be utilized 
elsewhere. The Navy has additional concerns about vessel safety 
in a polar ice-free world, since mapping of shifting ice locations 
will become more difficult.34
The United States has the most varied and severe weather 
of any country on Earth.35 With vast, drought-prone, high, arid 
plains, extensive coasts vulnerable to sea level rise, coasts that 
have already been battered by record-intensity hurricanes, and 
plains repeatedly flooded by rivers following massive rains and 
snow-melt runoff, the United States has more to lose in terms of 
climate change induced domestic threats than nearly any other 
country, except perhaps those that will be lost to the oceans.36 
The western states should prepare for decreased snowpack and 
correspondingly reduced summer runoff37 and extended periods 
of drought.38 Without even addressing the military components 
of homeland security, these direct impacts on the infrastructure, 
economy, and livelihoods of citizens threaten the security of 
most of the largest cities in the U.S., because they are located 
on coasts, and much of the farmland located in flood plains.39 It 
is clear, however, that changing precipitation patterns, increased 
severe weather events, and rising sea levels are all expected in 
the future, with negative direct implications for U.S. national 
security interests.40
The more complex threats are the indirect effects, which 
result not from the changed climate and associated weather 
events, but from the human actions which follow. As resources 
become scarcer and local living conditions harsher, populations 
with weak governments that are unable to assist those people in 
adapting to changes will likely resort to methods of self-pres-
ervation.41 U.S. military leaders expect the United States will 
see increased conflict for resources, mass migrations to escape 
the dearth of resources, and incidences of terrorism.42 Where the 
most basic resource needs—food and water—go unmet, disputes 
spiral into full-fledged conflict,43 as evidenced by the “at least 
[eleven] violent conflicts since 1990 [which] have been fueled 
in part by the degradation of renewable natural resources.”44 In 
these situations, populations may turn to extremism and terror-
ism,45 similar to al-Qaida in Afghanistan where half the coun-
try’s gross domestic product comes from farming or ranching, 
but drought and overuse of the land has left most of the country 
at risk of desertification.46 Populations will also likely participate 
in mass migrations as environmental refugees increase global 
tensions and further strain resources in the new location.47 The 
IPCC and others believe that average global warming exceeding 
3.6°F may be dangerous,48 while others argue that 3.6°F “warm-
ing would be catastrophic for large segments of humanity.”49
This type of instability in the developing world is a “threat 
multiplier”50 and U.S. military leaders believe that “climate 
change will provide the conditions that will extend the war on 
terror”51 because “droughts, violent weather, ruined agricultural 
lands—those are the kinds of stresses we’ll see more of under cli-
mate change [which lead directly to] more poverty, more forced 
migrations, higher unemployment” so that “climate change pro-
longs those conditions [that increase terrorism risks] . . . [and] 
makes them worse.”52 Many nations that struggle to maintain 
political stability currently, or are likely terrorist safe-havens, are 
also highly vulnerable to destabilizing climate change impacts, 
such as drought,53 flooding,54 and increased disease.55 When a 
region is “traumatized by an event or a change in conditions trig-
gered by climate change . . . [i]f the government there is not able 
to cope with the effects . . . you can be faced with a collapsing 
state . . . as breeding grounds for instability, for insurgencies, for 
warlords.”56 Ultimately, these conditions enhance the threat of 
terrorist networks and risks for U.S. security.57
Increased temperatures will have dire consequences for 
fresh water access, flood mitigation, and human health.58 Access 
to fresh water for drinking, farming, and hygiene is threatened 
by changing precipitation patterns and especially by altered 
mountain glacier runoff.59 Three billion people already live in 
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water-stressed developing nations. However, that number is 
expected to increase to half of the global population by 2030 and 
those people will be exposed to high water stress, beyond what 
is currently experienced.60 In addition to the increased spread 
of disease resulting from reduced water availability,61 human 
exposure to malaria will double and dengue fever will increase 
with only a 1°F to 2°F temperature rise as the geographical 
range of mosquitoes expands to new regions.62 Drought—or 
permanently drier climates—result in food and water shortages, 
as seen in Darfur, Sudan, that pose serious threats to stability,63 
and these conditions are expected to increase around the globe.64 
What began in Darfur as a struggle between farmers and camel 
herders for minimal water during time of “drought” became a 
permanent end of precipitation in the region, leading to despera-
tion, civil unrest, and mass migrations.65 Mass migrations out of 
permanently “drought” afflicted areas into northern hemisphere 
countries should be anticipated, along with strained resources 
and tempers in all regions.66
Changes in sea level and acidity could also have a devastat-
ing impact on communities around the world.67 Approximately 
two-thirds of the world population lives within fifty miles of 
the coast, and in some places, including New Orleans and The 
Netherlands, below sea-level.68 Many vulnerable populations 
live within the expected zone of sea-level rise, including the 
ten million inhabitants living within three feet of sea-level in 
Bangladesh.69 In addition to the encroaching waters, many of 
the vulnerable populations are also vulnerable to the increasing 
acidity of the oceans, which is a primary source for protein for 
more than one billion people.70 Ocean acidity is increasing at a 
rate that will be evolutionarily difficult for fish to keep up with, 
and diminished food supplies are expected to result in greater 
unrest.71
Between increased crises within the United States, reduced 
capacity to respond to those crises, and the possibility of 
increased extremism abroad, climate change impacts directly 
and indirectly threaten U.S. national security. If the President 
truly believes that “[t]o advance our common security, we must 
address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster 
instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately 
undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within 
their borders,”72 then the United States must address climate 
change as a leading future cause of those political and economic 
de-stabilizers.
The developmenT and role oF  
naTIonal securITy law
The Obama Administration fully acknowledges that prompt 
and sweeping action is needed to bring greenhouse gases 
(“GHG”) to a safe level, thereby reducing the effects and degree 
of climate change.73 The 2010 NSS acknowledges that the “dan-
ger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe” and that 
the effects of climate change “will lead to new conflicts over 
refugees and resources” as well as “catastrophic natural disas-
ters.”74 However, the Administration incorrectly believes that 
comprehensive legislation from Congress is required before 
such climate protection actions can be taken.75 The Administra-
tion already has the authority to take decisive action under the 
National Security Act.
The National Security Act of 1947 (“NSA”) established the 
National Security Council (“NSC”) with the intention of ensur-
ing an open and effective working “relationship between those 
responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for military 
policy”76 by creating a central advisory coordinating office for 
all matters related to national security.77 Before World War II, 
it had become increasingly clear that the United States needed 
a more unified approach to deal with national security issues, 
and that need became apparent to the public at large with the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.78 The NSC may have originally been 
conceived of as an advisory group, rather than a force for imple-
mentation, but the group’s function has varied to both ends of 
that spectrum over the years.79
The sweeping language in the opening lines of the National 
Security Act of 1947 expresses Congress’s acknowledgement 
of the need for a large-scale program to address threats to U.S. 
security.80 The Act opens with the declaration that, “[i]n enact-
ing this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a com-
prehensive program for the future security of the United States; 
to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and pro-
cedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Gov-
ernment relating to the national security.”81 The Act does not 
define a threat to national security, instead leaving that unde-
fined for future experts to determine in order to fulfill the stated 
purpose of the Act.82
Congress also provided for a National Security Council 
whose purpose was advising the President regarding “the inte-
gration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the 
national security to enable the military services and the other 
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more 
effectively in matters involving the national security,”83 and 
other duties in addition to functions directed by the President.84 
Congress’s plain intention was government-wide policies pro-
moting national security. Though some members of Congress 
expressed concern that the NSA should not delegate unsuper-
vised authority to the Executive,85 they were persuaded that 
extensive delegation would not deprive Congress the author-
ity of oversight or implementation of new laws,86 and gave the 
Executive the power necessary to carry out the desired mission: 
protecting national security.87 Additionally, at the time of enact-
ment, like today, flexibility in national security was a serious 
concern and other members of Congress believed too many 
restrictions on military activity would undermine the purpose of 
unifying defense intelligence and strategy under this new pro-
tocol.88 Ultimately, Congress was convinced of the necessity 
of the NSC as an advisory council to the President and coordi-
nation center for all matters relating to national security.89 The 
result of these competing Congressional concerns was a broadly 
written statute creating the NSC, which has enabled Presidents 
to determine the structure and workings of the Council, while 
conforming to the purpose, functions, and duties established in 
the original Act of 1947.90
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Given the flexibility of the NSA, Presidents have altered 
the structure and use of the NSC from its beginnings to fit their 
leadership styles and the changing nature of the challenges faced 
by the nation at any particular time.91 Where President Truman 
rejected the authority to promote “implementation,” President 
Eisenhower specifically authorized the coordinated implemen-
tation of national security policies under the NCS, creating an 
Operations Coordinating Board.92 While this “implementa-
tion” function was criticized by some, its legal validity was not 
questioned,93 and President Kennedy went on to invoke similar 
powers during the Cuban Missile Crisis, even after rejecting the 
practice.94
The oscillating nature of the NSC95 peaked during President 
Reagan’s tenure, in the form of the Iran-Contra Affair, but ulti-
mately resulted in a strong and stable NSC to shape and monitor 
the implementation of national security policy.96 Accordingly, 
extensive reforms were made whereby the NSC became respon-
sible for making policy recommendations and “reviewing, coor-
dinating, and monitoring the implementation of national security 
policy.”97 Upon assuming office, President George H. W. Bush 
was able to use his experience as the lead intelligence officer to 
the NSC as a prior Director of National Intelligence to estab-
lish working groups (Policy Coordinating Committees “PCCs”) 
for the NSC that actually worked.98 This structure was also 
adopted by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush because of 
its effectiveness.99
Congressional approval of increased authority to the Execu-
tive was evident following the attacks on September 11, 2001 in 
the United States, in the creation of the Department of Home-
land Security,100 and in President Bush’s creation of a Homeland 
Security Council (“HSC”) with extensive powers.101 The Presi-
dent created the HSC to assist in developing and implementing 
homeland security policy, and created the Policy Coordinat-
ing Committees—modeled after the NSCs PCCs that became 
so effective under the first President Bush—to coordinate the 
development and implementation of homeland security policies, 
including working with local governments.102 Congress passed 
legislation supporting this Executive-created expanded author-
ity (the HSC’s creation), and authorized the Council to advise 
the President and “perform such other functions as the President 
may direct,”103 supporting a similar attitude towards the NSC, 
which also contains language authorizing “other functions as 
the President may direct.”104 Even before September 11, 2001, 
Congressional appreciation for the need of unified, flexible, and 
responsive national security systems, following increasing inter-
national terror attacks,105 was plainly expressed in the passage 
of the Intelligence Renewal Act of 1996.106
Specifically, Congress added the Committee on Transna-
tional Threats (“CTT”) to the NSC107 as part of a commitment to 
reexamine and modernize intelligence and security programs108 
following attacks on U.S. soil in the 1990s.109 The statute 
defines a “transnational threat” as “any transnational activity 
(including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery sys-
tems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the 
national security of the United States”110 or “any individual or 
group that engages in an activity referred to in [the prior defi-
nition].”111 The CTT is directed to “coordinate and direct the 
activities of the United States government relating to combat-
ing transnational threats.”112 The Committee is required to iden-
tify these threats; develop strategies to respond to such threats; 
“monitor implementation” of those strategies; make recommen-
dations of appropriate responses to specific transnational threats; 
develop policies and “procedures” to ensure effective informa-
tion sharing about such threats between Federal departments and 
agencies; and develop guidelines to enhance and improve the 
coordination of activities regarding national security.113
The Committee membership includes the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attor-
ney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, and any other members that the President chooses to 
include.114 The NSC membership has fluctuated remarkably 
since its inception,115 but Congress clearly granted the President 
authority to include any one else he believes is properly included 
for the purpose of protecting national security from transnational 
threats.
Congress understood when passing the Intelligence Renewal 
and Reform Act of 1996 that with the close of the Cold War, 
non-traditional factors, from increasingly varied sources,116 
influenced national security.117 Before passage of the law, floor 
speeches from members of both houses of Congress advocated 
for an adaptable118 and “dynamic” twenty-first century secu-
rity force119 to counter the “rapidly changing threats.”120 This 
included environmental research desired by the departments to 
increase “understanding of global environmental challenges.”121 
The language in the Conference Report indicates that Congress 
supports CTT engagement in both developing and implement-
ing coordinated policies across departments to protect the nation 
from transnational threats, whatever they may be.122
Climate change is a transnational threat to U.S. national 
security by the plain language of the law. First, it inherently 
extends beyond the national borders of the United States 
because it occurs across the planet through the atmosphere and 
oceans.123 Second, the negative impacts of climate change, doc-
umented above, both from a purely domestic perspective and 
from added tensions and risks at the global scale, establish the 
consequences of climate change as national security threats.124 
The original intention of Congress to create a unified security 
force capable of adapting to the emerging and unknown threats 
that left the United States vulnerable prior to World War II sup-
ports these broad and evolving views of national security.125 
Even President George W. Bush’s policies support the inclu-
sion of climate change by including “manmade disasters” in the 
realm of national security.126 Thus climate change plainly falls 
within the delegated responsibility of the NSA’s Committee on 
Transnational Threats.
Congress has specifically recognized the importance of 
climate change in the context of national defense127 and, since 
2008, has required the Department of Defense to include the 
armed forces capability to handle “the consequences of climate 
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change” in its Quadrennial Defense Review.128 At the same 
time, Congress required all future National Security Strategy129 
and National Defense Strategy reports to provide military per-
sonnel guidance on how to “assess the risks of projected climate 
change.”130
Excuses that responsibility for implementing policies to 
protect against climate change are already within the authority 
of other departments and agencies within the Executive, and thus 
outside the President’s authority within the NSC, are unfounded. 
This argument rests on CO2 regulation by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”), which currently only has authority 
to regulate GHG emissions131 to protect the public health or wel-
fare.132 EPA does not have authority to implement GHG policies 
to protect national security.133 The President and his NSC have 
a mandate to do so,134 and climate change policy is not solely 
about air quality standards, but also about protecting Americans 
from increasing threats posed by catastrophic weather events, 
destabilized global populations, and terrorism.
The variation in Presidential styles and uses of the NSC over 
the years, recently expanded powers granted to the Presidency, 
and creation of the CTT all demonstrate the President’s power to 
use the NSC to establish policies and to oversee their implemen-
tation in the other departments. President Obama ought to use 
his NSC to implement policies protecting the U.S. from modern 
threats,135 since the purpose of the Act was to provide the United 
States with a “comprehensive program . . . of integrated policies 
and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of 
the government relating to the national security.”136 Congress 
has recognized climate change as a national security issue137 and 
it is now the President’s responsibility to use the NSC and the 
CTT to their fullest capacity, as Congress intended, to protect 
U.S. security.
recommendaTIons
U.S. national security policies cannot be based on inter-
nationally accepted science, when that science is subject to 
manipulation by segments of the U.S. public and private sec-
tors, as well as some of the very nations whose activities may 
threaten U.S. national security.138 To adequately address climate 
change in the national security context, the United States ought 
to abandon its reliance on the conservative IPCC estimates and 
use the best available science to determine the actual risks, and 
likelihood of those risks, to people, property, and interests of 
the United States.139 Recent studies, including those by NASA 
scientists, make clear that change must occur promptly to ade-
quately reduce CO2 levels.
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The United States should also take on the challenge like a 
new Cold War, fully deploying all resources necessary to defeat 
the threat. President Obama already recognized this in his 2010 
National Security Strategy stating,
[w]hen the world was confronted by fascism, America 
prepared itself to win a war and to shape the peace 
that followed. When the United States encountered an 
ideological, economic, and military threat from com-
munism, we shaped our practices and institutions at 
home—and policies abroad—to meet this challenge. 
Now, we must once again position the United States 
to champion mutual interests among nations and 
peoples.141
Fully engaging to defeat the threats of climate change will 
require more than just tax incentives—though these should be 
utilized too—it will require significant financial investment in 
overhauling U.S. infrastructure and international diplomatic 
maneuvering to effect the necessary changes.142
First, the President should implement an aggressive green 
Job Corps program, in the style of President Franklin Roos-
evelt’s Works Progress Administration, employing Americans 
and building U.S. infrastructure for the new technological age, 
harnessing the power of proven renewable energy resources.143 
While such a program would cost significant sums of money, it 
would also provide jobs to millions of Americans144 who cur-
rently receive ongoing unemployment benefits, without any ben-
efit to U.S. infrastructure, as the job market refuses to improve 
significantly.145 These jobs would vary in skill level from senior 
planning positions to low-skill labor jobs building and installing 
the new electrical generation and transmission systems. Addi-
tionally, proven economic advantages exist in moving to a low-
carbon economy.146 Similar to the construction of the National 
System of Interstate and Defense Highways under President 
Eisenhower, this new infrastructure system is necessary for 
U.S. security in the future.147 Not only are U.S. civilians reli-
ant on the current fossil-fuel-burning energy grid, exposing cit-
ies and entire regions to potential brown-outs,148 so too is the 
U.S. military which relies almost entirely on the national power 
grid at fixed installations and on petroleum in combat and opera-
tions.149 Thus, strategic security motivations exist for moving 
to renewable energies that actually improve battlefield readi-
ness.150 Dependence on fuel supply lines reduces operational 
preparedness, and results in astronomical monetary costs asso-
ciated with transporting large quantities of fuel in comparison 
to the dependable renewable energy options, while jeopardizing 
troops’ lives.151
Second, working with the Secretary of State, the President 
must actively convince other nations, like China, to do the same, 
to secure U.S. security into the future.152 This could be accom-
plished in a similar fashion to the “space race,”153 but intention-
ally created, since countries that implement the new technologies 
first will be better prepared for the future.154 Unfortunately, the 
2010 NSS claim that the United States is “promoting universal 
values abroad by living them at home,”155 is simply not true.156 
The 2010 NSS claims that the United States must be a global 
leader and “reengage the world” to facilitate “global cooperation 
on issues . . . [including] climate change . . . that challenge all 
nations, but that no one nation alone can meet.”157 These state-
ments, while true, effectively punt U.S. responsibility in dealing 
with climate change by: emphasizing the global nature of the 
problem and the need for individual nations to take responsibil-
ity; professing U.S. leadership on climate change solutions while 
also asserting that the U.S. will meet climate goals; but hedging 
the promise with the need for Congressional action.158 Now is 
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not the time for the United States to shy away, but the time to 
lead by example and convince others to join our efforts, through 
diplomacy and fear of future ostracism in the global community 
for failure to adopt clean renewable energy technology.
conclusIon
The impacts of climate change touch every aspect of U.S. 
national security. They increase destabilization of governments 
and demands on U.S. resources to aid or re-stabilize a region 
after a crisis. They threaten U.S. land, people, and infrastructure 
around the world, and are largely preventable. However, they 
are only preventable if the Administration takes responsibility 
for our future and utilizes the resources available to it, indeed 
required of it, to protect the national security of the United 
States. The President should seek Senate approval to appoint 
the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and Labor, as well as the 
EPA Administrator, to the NSC.159 The President should rely 
on the best science available, not the lowest common denomi-
nator, and should take responsibility on the international stage 
for U.S. CO2 emissions by making the United States the leader 
in climate change mitigation technology, enabling effective dip-
lomatic and economic pressure in convincing other nations to 
do the same. The President has the authority, and the responsi-
bility, to establish these policies and procedures to protect U.S. 
national security.
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